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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LABOR LAW-WORK PRESERVATION-IDENTIFICATION OF WORK
AT ISSUE REQUIRES ANALYSIS OF BARGAINING UNIT TRADITIONAL
WORK PATTERNS. NLRB v. International Longshoremen 's Association,
100 S. Ct. 2305 (1980). The International Longshoremen's Association
(ILA)I and a multiemployer bargaining association 2 entered into a col-
lective bargaining agreement3 containing provisions with respect to
containerization. 4 Containerization is a technological innovation that
threatens the jobs of longshoremen.5 The agreement provided that ILA
labor perform all stuffing and stripping6 of containers within the local
port area.7 Under the liquidated damages provision of the contract, a
joint union-management committee fined certain employer shipping
companies for transacting business with the charging parties, motor
carriers and consolidators engaged in off-pier stuffing and stripping of
containers.8 The shipping companies subsequently ceased doing busi-
ness with the charging parties.9
The National Labor Relations Board (Board), in separate proceed-
1. The ILA is the bargaining representative for all longshoremen represented in this dispute.
100 S. Ct. 2305, 2309 n.10 (1980).
2. The Council of North Atlantic Shipping Association (CONASA) is a multiemployer bar-
gaining association representing employers' shipping organizations, including the New York Ship-
ping Association (NYSA), the Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore (STAB), and the
Hampton Roads Shipping Association (HRSA). Since 1970, CONASA has bargained with ILA
on a master-contract basis. Id
3. The relevant provisions have been termed the Rules on Containers (Rules), and are con-
tained in the 1974-77 collective bargaining agreement. 100 S. Ct. at 2310.
4. Containers are large, reusable metal receptacles capable of accommodating 30,000
pounds of cargo and can be transported intact on and off an ocean vessel. 100 S. Ct. at 2308. See
generally Note, Containerization and Intermodal Service in Ocean Shipping, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1077
(1969).
5. Containerization has enabled the shipping industry to drastically reduce the amount of
on-pier work traditionally performed by longshoremen. 100 S. Ct. at 2309. This innovation has
had a profound impact on the shipping industry and waterfront labor relations. See Fairley, The
IL WU-PMA Mechanization and Modernization Agreement, 12 LAB. L.J. 664 (1961); Ross, Water-
front Labor Response to Technological Change: A Tale of Two Unions, 21 LAB. L.J. 397 (1970).
See generally Note, Technological Change.- Management Prerogative vs. Job Security, 31 IND. L.J.
389 (1956).
6. Stuffing and stripping are industry terms of art defining the process by which cargo is
packed into and removed from a container. 100 S. Ct. at 2310.
7. The local port area encompasses a geographical radius of fifty miles from the port. Id
8. See 100 S. Ct. at 2311-12, 2321 (app.).
9. Id
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ings,' 0 found that the contract provisions and their enforcement consti-
tuted a "hot cargo" agreement, I" and a secondary boycott' 2 respectively
proscribed by sections 8(e) 3 and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 14 of the National Labor
Relations Act.' The cases were consolidated on appeal, 6 and a di-
vided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia vacated the orders and remanded the case. 17 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari'" and held: Identification of
work in controversy in technological displacement cases requires an
analysis of the traditional work patterns that the bargaining unit em-
ployees seek to preserve, which is divorced from all considerations of
similar work performed by other employee bargaining units.' 9
Section 8(b)(4)(B)21 of the Taft-Hartley Act,l2 enacted in 1947, pro-
10. International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Dolphin Forwarding, Inc.), 236 N.LR.B. 525
(1978); International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Associated Transport, Inc.), 231 N.L.R.B. 351 (1977).
11. A hot cargo agreement is one under which the employer agrees to refrain from transact-
ing business with designated employers. See Nash, Connell "Hot Cargo" Arguments" 7he
Supreme Court as Interpreted by the NLR.B, 83 DICK. L. REv. 661, 663 (1974).
12. A secondary boycott involves the application of economic pressure on a neutral party to
coerce that party to cease doing business with an employer with whom the union has a dispute.
See id at 662.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter
into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or
refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or other-
wise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business
with any other person ....
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents...
(4)(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce ... where...
an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or
to cease doing business with any other person ....
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The Board held that the Rules and their enforcement consti-
tuted an unlawful attempt to acquire work not previously performed by the bargaining unit. In-
ternational Longshoremen's Ass'n (Dolphin Forwarding, Inc.), 236 N.L.R.B. 525, 526 (1978);
International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Associated Transport, Inc.), 231 N.L.R.B. 351, 352 (1977).
See also notes 32-34 infra and accompanying text for discussion of "work acquisition."
16. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
17. The Court held that the Rules represented a lawful attempt to preserve work for the
bargaining unit employees and that the Board erred as a matter of law in defining the work in
controversy. Id at 914. See notes 32-34 &fra and accompanying text for discussion of "work
preservation."
18. See 100 S. Ct. 2305 (1980).
19. See id at 2315.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(bX4)(ii)(B) (1976).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976).
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hibits a labor organization from applying coercive pressure2 on a neu-
tral employer' to force that employer to cease doing business with
another.2 4 The Supreme Court in Local 1976, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door) I construed the prohibited conduct
narrowly 26 by holding that an employer's voluntary compliance with a
boycott provision of a collective bargaining agreement rendered the
boycott lawful.2
In 1959 Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act28 in part to close
the loophole created by Sand Door.2 9 Section 8(e) of the Landrum-
Griffin Act prohibits voluntary agreements to boycott the goods or
services of any other person?0 Although the statutory language pros-
22. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 68 (1964) ("coercive"
includes any form of economic pressure of a sufficiently compelling or restraining nature); Inter-
national Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 701 (1951) (coercive pressure includes
peaceful picketing and "every form of influence and persuasion"); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Con-
str. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 686 (1951) (same); Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. v. General
Longshore Workers, 591 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1979) (use of contractually authorized fining
mechanism against employer held "coercive"); Carrier Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d
1178 (2d Cir. 1976) (resort to grievance proceedings held coercive), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1975) (same).
23. Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act was enacted to shield unoffending employers from union
pressures designed to involve them in disputes not their own. NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam
Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 523 (1977); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S.
616, 634 (1975); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951).
An employer is neutral for purposes of this section if it does not have the power to assign the
work in controversy. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 100 S. CL at 231? NLRB v.
Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 526 (1977); George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB,
490 F.2d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 1973).
24. Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act does not require that a union demand a complete termina-
tion of the business relationship. The language requires an analysis of the union's goal and the
foreseeable consequences of the secondary pressure. NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 400 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1971); Kaynard v. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 576 F.2d 471,
477 (2d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Local 3, IBEW, 467 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (2d Cir. 1972) (requirement
met if foreseeable consequence is more than a slight disruption of the business relationship);
NLRB v. Local 85, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 875, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1972).
25. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
26. "Employees must be induced .. to engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object
must be to force or require their employer or another person to cease doing business with a third
person." Id. at 98.
27. Id at 98-99.
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
29. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616,628 (1975). Seegener-
ally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1086
(1960); Cox, The Lan&um-Gium Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MiNN. L.
REV. 257 (1959).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
Washington University Open Scholarship
296 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:293
cribes all boycott agreements, the Supreme Court in National Wood-
work Manufacturers Association v. NLRB 3 I held that those agreements
that seek to "shield" and preserve the work traditionally performed by
the bargaining unit employees are "primary" and lawful.32 The Court
intimated in dictum, however, that a boycott used as a "sword" to mo-
nopolize or to acquire new jobs is "secondary" and might violate the
proscriptions of the National Labor Relations Act.33 Courts subse-
quent to National Woodwork have upheld boycott agreements that pre-
serve the work of bargaining unit employees. The courts have
invalidated "secondary" agreements, which attempt to acquire work
for the bargaining unit.34
The Supreme Court delineation between lawful primary activity and
31. 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967). See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 110,
247-52 (1967).
32. A determination of the primary or secondary nature of an agreement must involve an
inquiry into all of the surrounding circumstances. 386 U.S. at 645.
The Court noted that such circumstances might include "the remoteness of the threat of dis-
placement by the banned product or services, the history of labor relations between the union and
the employers who would be boycotted, and the economic personality of the industry." Id at 644
n.38. See generally Note, A Rational Aproach to Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 57
VA. L. REV. 1280, 1297-1300 (1971).
33. See 386 U.S. at 630-31.
34. The bargaining unit for which a union may lawfully seek to preserve work is that unit for
which separate collective bargaining occurs. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (D. Fortunato,
Inc.), 197 N.L.R.B. 673, 675 (1972); United Mine Workers, 165 N.L.R.B. 467, 468 (1967).
The Court in NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 100 S. Ct. at 2313, advocated a
two-pronged test to ascertain the nature of the boycott. First, the Board must define the work at
issue by focusing on the work traditionally performed by the bargaining unit employees. Second,
a lawful, "primary" agreement must seek to do no more than preserve the work of the bargaining
unit employees.
See Grandad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1979) (efforts to
preserve work for bargaining unit held valid); California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Associated
Gen. Contractors, 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977) (same). But see Pacific N.W. Chapter of Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1979) (clause operating
for general benefit of union held invalid); Carrier Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 1178,
1187 (2d Cir. 1976) (provision seeking work of "new product" held invalid), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
974 (1977); Griffith Co. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854
(1977); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1975) (same); Local
282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (D. Fortunato, Inc.), 197 N.L.R.B. 673 (1972) (clause seeking work
more expansive than that traditionally performed held invalid); Culinary Alliance Local 402, 175
N.L.R.B. 161, 168-69 (1969) (clause seeking new work held invalid).
See generally Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 538 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (primary activity must be "germane to the economic integrity of the principal work
unit"); Lesnick, The Gravamen ofthe Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1962); Nash,
Connell "Hot Cargo"Agreements: The Supreme Court as Interpreted by the NLRB, 83 DICK. L.
REv. 661, 664 (1979); Comment, Subcontracting Clauses and Section 8(e) of the National Labor
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unlawful secondary activity is somewhat "more nice than obvious."35
The distinction has proved particularly troublesome when the bargain-
ing unit employees seek not only to preserve traditional work, but also
to recapture work previously displaced by technological innovation.36
Courts have construed National Woodwork to protect certain boycott
activity directed toward work recapture or "reacquisition. 37
The Eighth Circuit in American Boiler Manufacturers Ass'n v.
NLRB, 31 a decision hailed as the "seminal recapture case,"' 39 clearly
recognized the legitimacy of efforts to recapture work diminished by
technological changes.4' American Boiler confined its holding, how-
ever, to reacquisition efforts aimed at work currently performed but at
a greatly reduced level.4 The court expressly declined to decide the
lawfulness of a restrictive clause that attempted to acquire work never
performed by the bargaining unit or work lost to technology prior to
contract negotiations.42 Precise criteria that delineate the parameters of
lawful reacquisition efforts have not evolved in the courts.4 3 Rather,
decisions have utilized the elusive terms of "traditional"'  or "fairly
Relations Act, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1176 (1964); Note, Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 77
YALE LJ. 1401 (1968).
35. See Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB (General Electric), 366 U.S. 667,
674 (1961).
36. One author notes that such efforts "involve a measure of both preservation of existing
jobs threatened by further erosion and acquisition of jobs which are currently held by non-unit
workers and which have displaced traditional unit work assignments." See 90 HARV. L. REV. 815,
821 (1977).
37. Local 742, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (legit-
imate work preservation objective if the tasks and skills required for the new product are "closely
related" to those skills required for traditional work), vacated on other grounds, 430 U.S. 912
(1977); American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 554 (8th Cir. 1968) (reacquisition of
that portion of work "lost" to technology held valid), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970); Meat &
Highway Drivers Local 710 v. NLRB (Wilson & Co.), 335 F.2d 709, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (union
can recapture "fairly claimable" work); Retail Clerks' Local 648 (Brentwood Markets, Inc.), 171
N.L.R.B. 1018, 1020 (1968) (efforts to attain work of a similar nature to that currently performed
held valid).
38. 404 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
39. 90 HARV. L. REv. 815, 822 (1977).
40. See 404 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
41. Id
42. Id
43. See Local 546, Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, 133 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1316-17 (1961)
(restrictive agreements curtailing subcontracting of work "regularly performed" requires a sepa-
rate examination of each such contract or agreement). See also Note, A Rational Approach to
Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1280, 1296-97 (1971); Note, Secondary
Boycotts and Work Preservation, 77 YALE L.J. 1401, 1406 (1968).
44. The term "traditional work" has been defined as that work which the bargaining unit has
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claimable"45 work to define the scope of lawful work preservation ef-
forts.4 6
The Board, in a series of decisions47 prior to NLR v. ILA, con-
fronted the legality of ILA efforts to capture a portion of the work gen-
erated by containerization. The Board in each decision narrowly
defined work in controversy by focusing on geographic location, type of
company performing the work, and type of cargo.48  The Board con-
cluded that work generated by containerization was not work tradition-
ally performed by longshoremen but, rather, traditional work of
competing employee units.4 9 Thus, the Board held that the provisions
performed and is still performing at the time the clause is negotiated. American Boiler Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
45. Fairly claimable work has been defined as that work which is "of the type which the men
in the bargaining unit have the skills and experience to do." Meat & Highway Drivers, Local 710
v. NLRB (Wilson & Co.), 335 F.2d 709, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
46. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 223 v. NLRB, 498 F.2d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("fairly
claimable" work standard employed); Wilson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 471, 361
F. Supp. 1151, 1156 (D. Minn. 1973) (fairly claimable work is work of the same type or category);
Retail Clerks' Local 648 (Brentwood Markets, Inc.), 171 N.L.R.B. 1018, 1020 (1968) (fairly claim-
able work is work of the same "generic" classification). Cf National Maritime Union v. Com-
merce Tanker Corp., 457 F.2d 1127, 1134 (2d Cir. 1972) (findings of organizational objectives in
addition to work preservation objective rendered conduct unlawful); Local 98, Sheet Metal Work-
ers v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 1189, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (work not traditionally performed by work unit
held not fairly claimable); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1288 v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (findings of organizational objectives in addition to work preservation objective rendered
conduct unlawful); Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(same); Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (D. Fortunato, Inc.), 197 N.L.R.B. 673, 678 (1972)
(work of a similar nature requiring like skills held not claimable by unit when a "substantial
portion" of the work had not previously been performed by unit employees); Asbestos Workers
Union, 139 N.LR.B. 688, 701 (1962) (union members without requisite skills to perform work
compelled finding of unlawful secondary purpose).
Decisions involving "new" work, which is closely related to the "traditional" work of the bar-
gaining unit, reflect the tenuous nature of the classifications. See, eg., Canada Dry Corp. v.
NLRB, 421 F.2d 907, 909 (6th Cir. 1970) (shelving of new brands of goods held to be of the same
"type" of work traditionally performed); Retail Clerks' Union, Local 648 (Brentwood Markets,
Inc.), 171 N.L.R.B. 1018, 1026 (1968) (work sought fell within same generic classification as job
tasks traditionally performed). See aso R. Go RMAN, BASIc TExr ON LABOR LAW UNION zATION
AND COLLECrVE BARGAINING 268 (1976).
47. See note 49 infra.
48. In each instance the Board defined the work in controversy as either LCL ("less than
container load"), LTL ("less than trailer load"), or FSL ("full shippers' loads") cargo work per-
formed by the charging parties at their own off-pier premises. See International Longshoremen's
Ass'n (Consolidated Express, Inc.), 221 N.L.R.B. 956 (1976).
49. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977); International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n Local 1575 v. NLRB, 226 N.L.R.B. 34, 37 (1976), enforced, 560 F.2d 439 (1st
Cir. 1977) (evidence of organizational motives strengthened conclusion of illegal secondary mo-
tive); Consolidated Express v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 221 N.L.R.B. 956, 961 (1975), &3(brced,
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and their enforcement constituted unlawful hot cargo agreements50 and
secondary boycotts51 prohibited by sections 8(e)52 and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)5 3
of the National Labor Relations Act. 4
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. ILA" held that the Board's defini-
tion of work in controversy was erroneous as a matter of law. 6 The
Court noted that the Board focused on the work performed by the
charging parties after the advent of containerization.57 This approach
"foreclosed-by definition-any possibility that the longshoremen
could negotiate an agreement [permitting] them to. . .play any part in
the loading or unloading of containerized cargo."58 The Court held
that the nature of the work performed by employees of the charging
parties and the secondary effects of the contract provisions on those
parties are irrelevant to ascertain the validity of the provisions. 9 The
legality of the agreement is contingent on whether the relationship be-
tween traditional work performed by the bargaining unit, and work
desired, denotes a work preservation objective.6" The Court remanded
the case to the Board for a factual determination of whether the Rules
attempt to preserve traditional longshoremen work,6 or whether they
602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. CL 3040 (1980); International Longshoremen's Ass'n
(Consolidated Express, Inc.), 221 N.L.R.B. 956 (1975) (Board found work acquisition objective
and abandonment of claim by 1959 contract; court affirmed on work acquisition basis only), aft'd,
537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union Local 13 (California Cartage Co.), 208 N.L.R.B. 994, 994-95 (1974)
("make-work" rights bargained away in earlier contract), enforced menm sub non Pacific Mari-
time Ass'n v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Intercontinental Container Trans-
port Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 887 (2d Cir. 1970) (work preservation
objective found in action brought under the Sherman Act); Balicer v. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 205 (D.N.J.), a.ff'dmen 491 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1973); International
Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1248 (Naval Supply Center), 195 N.L.RB. 273, 274 (1972).
50. See note 11 supra.
51. See note 12supra.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(iiXB) (1976).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
55. 100 S. CL 2305 (1980).
56. Id at 2315.
57. Id
58. Id See generally 90 HARv. L. Rav. 815, 825-28 (1977) (an in depth discussion of the
policy considerations underlying the narrow and broad views of work reacquisition agreements).
59. See 100 S. CL at 2315 n.22.
60. Id at 2316. The Court noted that the result would depend on "how closely the parties
have tailored their agreement to the objective of preserving the essence of the traditional work
patterns." Id at n.24.
61. Id at 2317. The Court noted that, in view of congressional preference for collective
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are "tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. 62
The Court in NLRB v. ILA recognized that in complex cases of tech-
nological innovation, a narrow definition of work in controversy effec-
tively denies workers the opportunity to preserve work patterns when
they accommodate management's desire to increase productivity.
Adoption of the Board's narrow definition of work in controversy pro-
duces an anomaly. Workers can lawfully preserve their jobs by arguing
against the implementation of an innovation,63 but cannot preserve the
work in controversy if they agree to accommodate the technological
change.' The Court perceived that the Board must define work in
controversy broadly by focusing on displacement of bargaining unit
employees to adequately extend the protection of the work preservation
doctrine to reacquisition agreements.65
The Court implicitly recognized that the longshoremen's efforts did
not present the classic work preservation situation 6 6 presented by Na-
tional Woodwork in which effects on third parties are minimal.67 In
contrast to National Woodwork, enforcement of the ILA contract provi-
sions would cause significant secondary effects by displacing workers in
other bargaining units.68 The ILA Court, however, refused to address
bargaining as the means for resolving these disputes, the question is not whether the Rules repre-
sent the most rational response to innovation, but whether they are a "legally permissible effort to
preserve jobs." Id
See generally National Woodwork Mfr's. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 642 (1967); Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543
(1964).
62. 100 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting National Woodwork Mfr's. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644
(1967)). If the Board does find that the Rules have a valid work preservation objective, the "right
to control" issue remains open on remand. For a discussion of the right to control doctrine, see
NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 521-28 (1977); Edwards, The Coming fAge
of the Burger Court: Labor Law Decisions ofthe Supreme Court During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C. L.
REv. 1, 37 (1977); Note, The Right-to-Control Test in Secondary Boycotts: NLRB '. Enterprise
Ass'n of Steam Ppeftters Local 638, 31 Sw. L.J. 947, 948-51 (1977).
63. See National Woodwork Mfr's. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
64. See 100 S. Ct. at 2316.
65. See id at 2315. See generally 90 HARV. L. REv. 815, 825 (1977).
66. See 100 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
67. Enforcement of a classic work preservation clause produces minimal secondary effects
because the boycotted employer is not deprived of work he has relied on in the past. He is simply
denied the opportunity to acquire new work from the primary employer. Comment, Subcontract-
ing Clauses and Section 8(e) ofthe National Labor Relations Act, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1176, 1188
(1964).
68. Chief Justice Burger points out in dissent that this is "far from a classic case of labor
[Vol. 59:293
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itself to the secondary effects problem.69 The Court, consistent with the
congressional preference for resolving disputes through the collective
bargaining process, relegated resolution of the issue to collective bar-
gaining tables. 0
The IL4 Court's deference to the collective bargaining process does
not appear to present an adequate solution to the difficult and sensitive
issues created by massive technological displacement of workers. Until
Congress enacts a statutory scheme, however, to confront the problems
generated by the technological displacement of workers, there appears
to be no adequate alternative to the ILA Court's holding.7'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-CONDITIONING
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT ON POLITICAL AFFILIATION UNRELATED TO JOB
PERFORMANCE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507 (1980). When the Democrats gained control of the Rockland
County legislature in 1977, they appointed petitioner Branti to the posi-
tion of Public Defender to replace the Republican incumbent.' Upon
taking office, Branti issued termination notices to six of the nine assis-
tant public defenders,2 including respondents Finkel and Tabakman.
versus management. Here, one segment of labor seeks to take work away from another segment."
100 S. Ct. at 2324 n.I. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The severity of the disruption on other bargaining units is intensified because the longshoremen
had, in prior collective bargaining agreements, permitted outside workers to perform the work
now claimed. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Dolphin Forwarding, Inc.), 236 N.L.R.B.
525, 526 (1978); International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Associated Transport, Inc.), 231 N.L.R.B.
351, 355 (1977) (Fanning, Chairman, dissenting). For a discussion of contractual abandonment of
claims, see International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Local 13 (California Cartage Co.),
208 N.L.R.B. 994, 996 (1974), enforcedmen. sub nom Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. NLRB, 515 F.2d
1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 90 HARv. L. REv. 815, 827 (1977). But see International Longshoremen's
Ass'n v. NLRB (Consolidated Express, Inc.), 537 F.2d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1976).
69. See 100 S. Ct. at 2315 n.22.
70. See id at 2314, 2317. See also note 61 supra and accompanying text.
71. See generally International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890, 893, n.ll
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4)
and8(e), 113 U. PA. L. Rv. 1000, 1041 (1965).
1. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 509 (1980).
2. Id at 509.
3. Respondent Tabakman was a registered Republican. Id Respondent Finkel changed
his party affiliation in 1977 from Republican to Democrat to enhance his chances of reappoint-
ment. The district court found that despite Finkel's change in political affiliation, the parties re-
garded him as a Republican during the period in issue. Id at 509 n.4.
Washington University Open Scholarship
